Signaling Extended Deterrent Threats: Beijing as a Signaler During the Cold War by Huang, Yuxing
Persistent link: http://hdl.handle.net/2345/2168
This work is posted on eScholarship@BC,
Boston College University Libraries.
Boston College Electronic Thesis or Dissertation, 2011
Copyright is held by the author, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise noted.
Signaling Extended Deterrent Threats:
Beijing as a Signaler During the Cold
War
Author: Yuxing Huang
1 
 
 
Boston College 
The Graduate School of Arts and Sciences 
Department of Political Science 
SIGNALING EXTENDED DETERRENT THREATS:  
BEIJING AS A SIGNALER DURING THE COLD WAR  
Thesis 
by 
YUXING HUANG 
submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of 
Master of Arts 
 
May, 2011 
 
  
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© copyright by YUXING HUANG 
                                            2011 
3 
 
Table of Contents 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT  ................................................................................................4 
ABSTRACT  .......................................................................................................................5 
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................6 
CREDIBILITY OF EXTENDED DETERRENT THREATS ........................................7 
SOURCES OF EXTENDED DETERRENCE OUTCOMES ....................................7 
CLEAR-CUT SIGNALS AS THE BETTER CHOICE  ...........................................11 
CASE SELECTION  ....................................................................................................13 
CHINA’S AMBIGUOUS SIGNALS IN 1950  ...............................................................14 
CHINA’S SIGNALS AND U.S. DETERRABILITY  ................................................15 
AMBIGUOUS SIGNALS  ...........................................................................................17 
TESTING COMPETING THEORIES  .....................................................................26 
CONCLUSIONS  ..........................................................................................................30 
CHINA’S CLEAR-CUT SIGNALS IN 1965  ................................................................30 
CHINA’S SIGNALS AND U.S. DETERRABILITY  ................................................31 
CLEAR-CUT SIGNALS  .............................................................................................33 
TESTING COMPETING THEORIES  .....................................................................40 
CONCLUSIONS  ..........................................................................................................44 
CHINA’S AMBIGUOUS SIGNALS IN 1978  ...............................................................45 
CHINA’S SIGNALS AND VIETNAM’S DETERRABILITY  ................................45 
AMBIGUOUS SIGNALS  ...........................................................................................47 
TESTING COMPETING THEORIES  .....................................................................54 
CONCLUSIONS  ..........................................................................................................61 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY AND CHINA’S ASCENT ......................................61 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
 
This thesis could never have been done without the support of my mentors, 
friends, and Boston College. My greatest intellectual debt is to Professors Robert Ross 
and Timothy Crawford who supervised my thesis. They have read various drafts, and 
given me enormous amounts of time, incisive and constructive comments, which greatly 
helped me improve the thesis. I am especially thankful for their inspiration and support to 
my research and life in Boston. Many thanks to Department of Political Science, 
especially Carol Fialkosky, Boston College University Libraries, especially the 
interlibrary loan (ILL) service, and Fung Library at the Fairbank Center for East Asian 
Research of Harvard University, especially Nancy Hearst, for facilitating my research.  
I have benefited greatly from discussions with Professors Robert Art, Chen Qi, 
David Deese, Taylor Fravel, Seth Jacobs, Vojtech Mastny, Priscilla Roberts, Sun 
Xuefeng, Sun Zhe, Xu Jin, and Yan Xuetong. I am especially thankful to Professor Yan 
for helping me maintain momentum all the time in a foreign country. I am also grateful 
for the spiritual support of Professor Gerald Easter, who has invited me twice to his 
Thanksgiving Dinners.  
Special thanks go to my parents for their understanding and support for my 
academic career, and my friends—particularly Yang Yu’an, Wang Yanzhi and Lin 
Wutu—for their assistance and care over the past years.  
 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
SIGNALING EXTENDED DETERRENT THREATS:  
BEIJING AS A SIGNALER DURING THE COLD WAR 
 
THESIS BY 
Yuxing Huang 
 
THESIS ADVISORS 
ROBERT ROSS and TIMOTHY CRAWFORD 
 
MAY 2011 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the credibility issue in China’s extended deterrent attempts 
during the Cold War. In its efforts to protect North Korea, North Vietnam and 
Kampuchea, how did China convey its threats, and why did these initiatives have 
differing results? First, I argue that signaling is the key explaining credibility of China’s 
extended deterrent threats across space and time. While ambiguous signals ruined China’s 
credibility in deterring challenges on North Korea and Kampuchea, clear-cut signals 
backed threats in China’s attempts to save North Vietnam. Consequently, China’s signals 
in the first two cases were disregarded or misunderstood but were perceived as expected 
in the last case. Secondly, the paper seeks to appraise the explanatory power of current 
theoretical approaches with regard to the effectiveness of extended deterrent threats. 
Balance of interests (BOI) and Balance of Capabilities (BOC) shed lights on sources of 
deterrence outcomes, but neither of them is sufficient to explain the cases. The paper 
concludes that China’s peaceful rising is more likely if Beijing signals its interests and 
capabilities more clearly.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
“Deterrence, in its broadest sense, means persuading an opponent not to initiate a 
specific action because the perceived benefits do not justify the estimated costs and 
risks.”1 If potential attacks target on a state’s protégés, “basic” deterrence develops into 
extended deterrence. Once armed forces and sustained combat are involved, deterrent 
attempts will fail.2
Straightforward as it seems, evaluation of deterrence is difficult for three reasons. 
First, according to deterrence theory, deterrence failure occurs only when the defender 
has “carefully defined the unacceptable behavior, threatened retaliation, had the 
capability to implement the threat, demonstrated resolve, but the challenger still 
proceeded to use force.”
  
3 Second, the challenger’s calculation in the first place is 
decisive. “The potential attacker would have attacked in the absence of a deterrent 
threat.”4 But evidence of the challenger’s intention is always limited. Third, two core 
concepts, credibility of the defender and deterrability of the challenger cannot be 
measured directly.5
This paper examines the credibility of China’s extended deterrent threats during 
the Cold War by asking two questions. First, how did China tailor its words and/or 
actions as signals to protect its protégés? Second, how did China manipulate the 
  
                                                          
1 John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 14.  
2 Paul K. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988), p. 26; 
Paul K. Huth, “Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debates,” Annual Review of 
Political Science, Vol. 2. (1999), p. 28.  
3 Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, “Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter,” World Politics, 
Vol. 41, No. 2, (January 1989), p. 220.  
4 Jack S. Levy, “When Do Deterrent Threats Work?” British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 18, No. 4. (October 
1988), p. 507.  
5 Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1981), p. 83; Daryl G. Press, Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), p. 11. 
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credibility of its threats? I  will begin with an outline of theoretical framework on 
signaling extended deterrent threats, and then proceed with the detailed discussion of 
three case studies through an examination of newly available primary sources—published 
archival sources, documentary collections, memoirs, and newspapers—as well as making 
inferences from secondary works and propaganda.6
 
 This study seeks to contribute to 
theoretical debates on sources of extended deterrence outcomes and China’s Cold War 
coercive diplomacy. 
CREDIBILITY OF EXTENDED DETERRENT THREATS 
 
SOURCES OF EXTENDED DETERRENCE OUTCOMES 
 
Although factors contributing to deterrence outcomes are always interconnected, 
extended deterrence outcomes can be explained by balance of interests (BOI), balance of 
capabilities (BOC), and communication.  
                                                          
6 Major sources cited in this paper include: (1) Shen Zhihua, ed., Chaoxian Zhanzheng: E’guo dang’an guan de jiemi 
wenjian [The Korean War: Declassified Documents from Archives in Russia] (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi 
yanjiusuo, 2003), cited as CXZZ; (2) Department of State Bulletin (Washington DC: United States Government 
Printing Office, various volumes), cited as DSB; (3) Foreign Relations of the United States, (Washington D.C.: United 
States Government Printing Office, various volumes), cited as FRUS; (4) Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao 
[Manuscripts of Mao Zedong Since the Founding of the Nation] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, various 
volumes), cited as JGYLMZDWG; (5) Jianguo yilai Zhou Enlai wengao [Manuscripts of Zhou Enlai Since the 
Founding of the Nation] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, various volumes), cited as JGYLZELWG; (6) Pang 
Xianzhi and Jin Chongji, eds., Mao Zedong zhuan (1949-1976) [Biography of Mao Zedong (1949-1976)] (Beijing: 
Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2003), cited as MZDZ; (7) Zhou Junlun, eds., Nie Rongzhen nianpu [A Chronicle of 
Nie Rongzhen’s Life] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1999), cited as NRZNP; (8) The Pentagon Papers: The Defense 
Department History of United States Decision-making on Vietnam, The Senator Gravel Edition, (Boston, MA: Beacon 
Press, 1971), cited as Pentagon Papers; (9) Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiao dashiji [Chronicle of Major Events in 
the History of Diplomacy in People’s Republic of China] (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 2002), cited as WJDJS; 
(10) Liu Wusheng and Du Hongqi, eds., Zhou Enlai junshi huodong jishi xiajuan [Chronicle of Zhou Enlai’s Military 
Activities] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2000), cited as ZELJSHDJS; (11) Zhou Enlai junshi wenxuan 
[Zhou Enlai’s Selected Works on Military Affairs] (Beijing: Remin chubanshe, 1997), cited as ZELJSWX; (12) Zhou 
Enlai nianpu, shangjuan [A Chronicle of Zhou Enlai’s Life] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1997), cited as 
ZELNP; (13) Chinese Foreign Ministry, ed., Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong dashiji, 1949-1975 [Chronicle of Major 
Events of Zhou Enlai’s Activities on Foreign Affairs, 1949-1975] (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1993), cited as 
ZELWJHDDSJ; (14) Jin Chongji, ed., Zhou Enlai zhuan [Biography of Zhou Enlai] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian 
chubanshe, 1998), cited as ZELZ. 
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BOI and BOC 
Extended deterrence involves conflict between a defender and a challenger. The 
defender’s risk acceptance can be determined by the relative importance of its protégé to 
its interests, and credibility of threats partly depends upon interests involved. 7 For 
example, as predicted by BOI, extended deterrent commitments are always suspect given 
the “selfish” nature of states.8 The primary interest of a defender is to deter potential 
attacks upon his own assets, not its protégé’s well-being.  If the challenger has more 
interests at stake vis-à-vis its defender, “[extended deterrent] threats may well be 
communicated clearly and credibly but, at the same time, be insufficient to deter.”9
BOI, nevertheless, is inadequate in two aspects. First, capabilities matter. A 
powerful defender may successfully deter a weak challenger, even though the defender 
has fewer interests involved. For instance, interests in West Berlin were favorable to the 
Soviets rather than the U.S. because of geopolitical considerations. However, Soviet 
challenges were always deterred by U.S. due to nuclear capabilities gap between them. 
Second, calculations of interests depend upon communication. As Richard Lebow and 
Janice Stein put it, “in crisis of misunderstanding, [t]he incompatibility of interests is 
more than real.”
  
10
                                                          
7 Vesna Danilovic, When the Stakes are High: Deterrence and Conflict among Major Powers (Ann Arbor, 
MI: University of Michigan Press, 2002), pp. 4-5.  
 It is therefore insufficient to explain deterrence failure in which BOI is 
8 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 36; Paul Gordon Lauren, 
“Theories of Bargaining with Threats of Force: Deterrence and Coercive Diplomacy,” in Paul Gordon Lauren, ed., 
Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy (New York, NY: Free Press, 1979), pp. 190-193; Huth, 
Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War, pp. 1-2; George, “Coercive Diplomacy: Definition and 
Characteristics,” pp. 280-281; Robert J. Art, “Coercive Diplomacy: What do we Know?” in Robert J. Art and Patrick 
M. Cronin, eds., The United States and Coercive Diplomacy (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace 
Press, 2003), p. 373. 
9 Paul Gordon Lauren, Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Challenges of Our 
Time (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 179.  
10 Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We all Lost the Cold War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1994), p. 322.  
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in the defender’s favor. If a challenger underestimates a defender’s interests involved due 
to the defender’s signaling efforts, deterrence is also likely to fail.11
These two limits will be discussed in detail in case studies. First, both China and 
the U.S. acknowledged that interests in North Korea were favorable to China, but 
Beijing’s extended deterrent efforts still failed in 1950.  Additionally, interests in North 
Korea and North Vietnam were favorable to China in 1950 and 1965 respectively, but 
deterrence outcomes were different. Washington underestimated Beijing’s interests in 
1950 through ambiguous signals, while correctly perceived them in 1965 through clear-
cut signals. In conclusion, BOI’s explanatory power cannot be directly extended to the 
effects of extended deterrent threats, although it could sometimes predicts deterrence 
outcomes.  
  
Credibility of threats also partially depends upon overall capabilities that a 
defender and a challenger can mobilize.12 BOC argues effective deterrence generally 
requires a wide capability gap in the defender’s favor.13
                                                          
11 Robert Jervis, “Deterrence and Perception,” International Security, Vol. 7, No. 3. (Winter 1982/1983), p. 28.  
 Reasonable as it seems, BOC has 
some loopholes as well in explaining deterrence failure. It offers weak explanation why a 
challenger may still initiate attacks regardless of his disadvantageous position and thus 
makes the deterrence not work at all. U.S. deterrence against Saddam Hussein, for 
instance, was ineffective although U.S. was much more powerful than its adversary. 
Misinterpretation of a defender’s signals, specifically, can make its challenger to be 
overconfident in its own capabilities, and deterrence is therefore likely to fail. As will be 
12 Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War, p. 4.  
13 Lawrence Freedman, “Strategic Coercion,’ in Lawrence Freedman, ed., Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases 
(New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 30.  
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shown in the paper, BOC were favorable to China in each case along its periphery, but 
deterrent attempts succeeded only in 1965, while failed in 1950 and 1978. 
 
Communication 
The study of communication is the study of signaling, because signals are the 
principal source for interpreting adversaries’ intentions. Specifically, signaling is 
important to the credibility because the defender’s claim to protect another party is more 
questionable in extended deterrence compared with basic deterrence.14
Problem of communication reflect either subjective or objective biases when 
interpreting signals. Psychological and cognitive bias is prevalent in international 
politics.
  
15  With regard to effective deterrence, it requires “both understanding the other 
side’s view of the state and predicting its view of the state’s policy. Unfortunately, often 
each side will have a different view, with the result that the actual impact of the policy 
greatly differs from the expected one.”16 Doctrinal difference as an example of subjective 
bias may explain conflict escalation and deterrence failure. When two nations have 
different theories of victory, a mutual misunderstanding of relative capabilities would be 
highly likely to lead to underestimation of the adversary and the failure of deterrence.17
Communication could also be affected by the “objective nature” of signals. 
Maximum explicitness in threats can result in maximum credibility. Ambiguity, on the 
  
                                                          
14 Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence Now (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 19; Timothy W. 
Crawford, “The Endurance of Extended Deterrence: Continuity, Change, and Complexity in Theory and Policy,” in T.V. 
Paul, Patrick M. Morgan, and James J. Wirtz, eds., Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age (Chicago, 
IL: University of Chicago Press, 2009). pp. 282-283.  
15 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1976).  
16 Robert Jervis, “Perceiving and Coping with Threat,” in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, 
eds., Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), p. 30.  
17 Christopher P. Twomey, The Military Lens: Doctrinal Difference and Deterrence Failure in Sino-American Relations 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010).  
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other hand, means indeterminacy, and mixed signals or ill-defined commitments leave 
too much leeway to be credible.18 In contrast, ambiguous signals can also lead to 
credibility for some reasons. First, signals “are not automatically accepted, especially 
when the perceiver has reason to believe a state would like an imaged accepted.”19 If so, 
a challenger is more likely to disregard the most clear-cut messages, since they are too 
explicit to believe. Second, ambiguity “creates anxiety in the opponent”, and thus engage 
adversary worst case analysis.20 If so, the challenger is more prone to retreat, and 
deterrent efforts are likely to succeed. Third, ambiguity makes it easier for a challenger to 
“save face” and thus to comply.21
The effectiveness of verbal and non-verbal signals has also been debated. 
Language could be powerful and costly when connected with reputation, such as when 
issuing an ultimatum.
  
22 However, nonverbal signals may be more credible because verbal 
messages can enable be manipulated to hide unfavorable interests and capabilities.23 
Bluffing, for instance, has a tempting “price/performance ratio.” Therefore, ordinary 
diplomatic statements could be no more than pale sheets of paper.24
 
 
CLEAR-CUT SIGNALS AS THE BETTER CHOICE 
 
                                                          
18 Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 40-41; Glenn 
H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1961), p. 246; Schelling, Arms and Influence, p. 48; Oran R. Young, The Politics of Force: Bargaining During 
International Crises (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 177; Deborah Welch Larson, Anatomy of 
Mistrust: U.S.-Soviet Relations During the Cold War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 31. 
19 Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 
11, pp. 130-131.  
20 Snyder, Deterrence and Defense, pp. 246-248.  
21 Crawford, “The Endurance of Extended Deterrence,” p. 290.  
22 Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations, pp. 19-20. 
23 Young, The Politics of Force, p. 27.  
24 Schelling, Arms and Influence, pp. 137,150; Young, The Politics of Force, p. 177; John Arquilla, “Louder Than 
Words: Tacit Communication in International Crises,” Political Communication, Vol. 9,. No. 3 (1992), pp. 155-172.  
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There are four key ways to signal a message: clearly, or vaguely, and in 
diplomatic words or in military maneuvers.25
Of these four ways, a clear-cut signals, in words or in deed, is a better choice to 
make extended deterrent attempts credible for three reasons. First, communication 
between adversaries will be in decline during crises, and information processing is 
always simplified that “only a small part of the relevant information will penetrate to the 
conscious level.”
 A clear-cut verbal signal formalizes in 
propaganda, public statements and speeches on a proposed retaliation against challenger’s 
attack. A non-verbal signal always involves military maneuvers and war preparation 
efforts to reinforce verbal signals. In contrast, ambiguous signals veil a defender’s 
intentions, which can be statements with blended demands and secret military maneuvers.  
26
                                                          
25 Statesmen can also signal intentions publicly or privately. Private threats can be equally effective as public threats. 
See Shuhei Kurizaki, “Efficient Secrecy: Public versus Private Threats in Crisis Diplomacy,” American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 101, No. 3 (2007), pp. 543-558.  
 Explicit signals can partially solve the information processing 
problem by making adversaries have more nuanced understanding of deterrent threats in 
the first place and then expect to receive more such signals from the defender at various 
stages in a crisis. In other words, a challenger will become more cautious when receiving 
clear-cut signals and the cautiousness will be reinforced by subsequent signals of the 
same kind.  Second, clear-cut verbal signals draw a line for a challenger to estimate the 
balance of interests, and thus affect the balance of motivation or resolve. If BOI does not 
favor a defender, for instance, explicitly referring to its interests through propaganda and 
diplomatic activities can bolster credibility. Although explicit signals guarantee no 
success, extended deterrence is more likely to fail without them. Third, the most effective 
signals always combines clear-cut verbal and nonverbal signals, since together the 
26 Ole R. Holsti, Crisis, Escalation, War (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1972), p. 82; Jack Snyder, The 
Psychology of Escalation: Sino-Soviet Relations, 1958-1963 (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1978), p. 8.  
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messages generate a powerful indication of the defender’s interests and capability, 
eliminating the inherent ambiguous impression of extended deterrent attempts. A 
challenger has no choice but to consider those costly signals seriously because the 
defender has demonstrated resolve and capabilities in a variety of ways.  
The relationship between BOC and the objective nature of signals is more 
complicated. First, if BOC favors the defender, clear-cut actions imply both strong 
resolve and sufficient preparation in conveying threats. If words are not effective, the 
defender can subsequently escalate through limited military operations or exemplary use 
of force to signal its seriousness. Second, with the combination of clear-cut signals, a 
favorable BOC, although still important, becomes less necessary. It is true there is no 
guarantee of the defender’s success only depending upon explicit signals, nevertheless, a 
disadvantaged defender’s clear signals can better elicit the challenger’s worst-case 
calculation than an advantaged defender’s ambiguous signals, and therefore make the 
deterrence more likely to work.  
 
CASE SELECTION 
 
To understand contextual factors and interpret evidence, detailed case studies are 
essential.27
                                                          
27 Janice Gross Stein, “Extended Deterrence in the Middle East: American Strategy Reconsidered,” World Politics, Vol. 
39, No. 3 (April 1987), pp. 328-329; Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, “Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent 
Variable,” World Politics, Vol. 42, No. 3 (April 1990), pp. 353-356. 
 In addition, structured focused comparison is a useful means to eliminate 
alternative explanations and find the most important variables across space and time. 
“The set of cases must be large enough to enhance the external validity and robustness of 
14 
 
the results, but it cannot be so large as to make detailed research impossible.”28 Cases are 
selected from extreme high or low values on casual variables with data richness to 
identify casual relations and make predictions.29
This paper will examine three extended deterrence cases involving the PRC 
(People’s Republic of China) during the Cold War—the Korean War (1950), Vietnam War 
(1965) and Sino-Vietnamese War (1979). First, independent variables—the 
clearness/vagueness of extended deterrent signals—all bear extreme values in these 
cases. As will be discussed in detail, ambiguous signals were applied in different ways in 
1950 and 1978, such as blending different demands, secret military maneuvers, and 
military aid to protégés without covered by propaganda. In contrast, China conveyed 
clear-cut threats in words and in deeds to deter potential U.S. attacks upon North Vietnam 
in 1965. Second, it is true that credibility consists of resolve, capability, and interests. 
  
30
 
 
As will be discussed nevertheless, neither BOI nor BOC can provide full interpretations 
of these cases if without consideration of signaling effects. The comparative case studies 
additionally show that signaling theory has greater explanatory power across space and 
time in all cases. Third, all three cases posit China in the defensive position during the 
Cold War, which can help us better understand China’s coercive diplomacy in the past 
and future.  
CHINA’S AMBIGUOUS SIGNALS IN 1950 
 
                                                          
28 Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1998), p. 25.  
29 Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), p. 
12.  
30 John David Orme, Deterrence, Reputation and Cold War Cycles (London: Macmillan, 1992), p. 147; Jonathan 
Mercer, Reputation and International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 15.  
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CHINA’S SIGNALS AND U.S. DETERRABILITY 
 
In this case, Beijing’s signaling strategy has been put front and center in 
academia. The first question is when the extended deterrent attempts failed. Answers 
were not unanimous and relied on inadequate primary sources. This scholarship mistook 
China’s diplomatic and military initiatives in late October 1950 for deterrent threats.31 In 
fact, PRC deterrent attempts failed on October 3.32 China’s diplomacy after the date did 
not represent any extended deterrent threat because China had already decided to 
intervene.33
The second question is more important—was China’s extended deterrent 
commitment well-communicated? Some scholars argue that China skillfully manipulated 
its signals.
  
34 However, viewed from a challenger’s perspective, China’s signals were 
ineffective. Washington clearly misunderstood most of the major signals, including 
Chinese leaders’ speeches, propaganda, and troop advances. As Allen Whiting puts it, 
“we cannot say that there was no element of bluff in Chinese pronouncements.”35  More 
specifically, “if either Russian or Chinese forces had already entered Korea or had 
announced that they intended to enter, [G]eneral MacArthur should [have] refrain[ed] 
from moving above the [38th] line.”36
                                                          
31 George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, pp. 188-189; Lebow, Between Peace and War, p. 95.  
  
32 Twomey’s arguments over the U.S. crossing of the 38th Parallel are invalid because he mainly depends on evidence 
after October 3. (Mis)perception and (mis)calculations following October 3 could not be causes of deterrence failure. 
See Twomey, The Military Lens, pp. 87-133.  
33 Thomas J. Christensen, “Threats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for Peace: The Lessons of Mao's Korean War 
Telegrams,” International Security, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Summer 1992), pp. 122-154. 
34Schelling, Arms and Influence, pp. 54-55; J. H. Kalicki, The Pattern of Sino-American Crises: Political-military 
Interactions in the 1950s (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 56.  
35 Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 1960), pp. 109-110.  
36 James F. Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The First Year (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), 
p. 179; James McGovern, To the Yalu: From the Chinese Invasion of Korea to MacArthur’s Dismissal (New York, NY: 
Morrow, 1972), pp. 41-42.  
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To answer the question why China’s signals were unreliable, a quick review of the 
process on both sides of deterrence is helpful. U.S. interests in South Korea were limited. 
Its priority was to avoid a military defeat in the South and a wider war with China. The 
CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) commented on June 30 that the implication of a U.S. 
defeat in Korea would mean that it would “become nearly impossible to develop effective 
anti-Communist resistance in Southeast Asia”.37 Yet simultaneously, “from a strategic 
point of view the Korean peninsula is not of such importance to the U.S. that it would be 
desirable to have large U.S. forces committed there”.38 It should not be forgotten that 
Washington’s primary concern from June to September was still to avoiding a direct 
military confrontation with Beijing. As President Truman recalled, “every decision I 
made in connection with the Korean conflict had this one aim in mind: to prevent a third 
world war.”39 He was therefore “careful not to cause a general Asiatic war” with China.40 
On September 11, Secretary of State Dean Acheson further suggested to President 
Truman that “the present day policy [i]s directed toward a localization of the conflict in 
Korea and the avoidance of any unnecessary extension of hostilities or the outbreak of a 
general war.”41
China initiated extended deterrent threats following the outbreak of the Korean 
War on 25 June 1950. Right before the breakdown of China’s deterrent efforts, Zhou 
Enlai, PRC Prime Minister, warned the U.S. through the Indian Ambassador to China, 
Kavilam Panikkar, on October 3 that U.N. (United Nations) forces, excluding the South 
  
                                                          
37 “Weekly Summary Excerpt, 30 June 1950, The Korean Situation,” in Woodrow J. Kuhns, ed., Assessing the Soviet 
Threat: The Early Cold War Years (McLean, VA: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 
1997), p. 391.  
38 “Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison),” FRUS, 1950, Vol. VII, p. 568. 
39 Truman, Memoirs, pp. 333, 345.  
40 Robert H. Ferrell, ed., Off the Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman,(New York, NY: Harper & 
Row, 1980), p. 185.  
41 “Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President,” FRUS, 1950, Vol. VII, p. 721.  
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Korean Army, should halt at the 38th parallel.42 President Truman perceived the threat 
that he called Zhou’s above message was a “bald attempt to blackmail”.43 However, 
China’s signals were unbelievable that the CIA concluded that Zhou’s warning was 
“primarily a last-ditch attempt to intimidate the U.S.”44 In fact, a day before, in General 
MacArthur’s instructions to the Eighth Army, the Commander in Chief of the U.N. 
Command stated that “the so-called 38th parallel accordingly is not the factor in the 
military employment of our forces. To accomplish the enemy’s complete defeat, your 
troops may cross the parallel at any time either in exploratory probing or exploiting local 
tactical conditions.”45
 
 Therefore, with its signals ignored, China’s deterrent attempts had 
failed.  
AMBIGUOUS SIGNALS 
 
As can be concluded from the case review, ambiguous communication derailed 
China’s deterrent attempts. China mixed three issues together in its verbal signals: 
warnings against U.S. attacks upon North Korea, admission to the U.N., and border 
defense. This signaling strategy blundered in many aspects. 
 
Ambiguous Words: Incompatible Goals in North Korea and U.N.  
China had two goals in late 1950: protecting North Korea and joining the U.N. In 
internal discussions, Mao Zedong, PRC Chairman, maintained that a buffer state was the 
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first priority warranted military intervention. From August 4, the CCP (Chinese 
Communist Party) Politburo discussed a possible North Korean military defeat at Pusan, 
with Zhou raising the idea of intervention, because “it will be unfavorable to peace, if 
U.S. imperialists oppress North Koreans. [So] China’s help is irreplaceable.”46 Mao 
replied: “If U.S. imperialists get the upper hand, they will grow bold and threaten us. We 
are obliged to help [North] Koreans by sending Chinese Volunteers.”47
Beijing also showed strong interest in joining the U.N. with Soviet support. 
Chinese leaders prepared to send a delegation for admission in January 1950. The 
outbreak of the Korean War enhanced Chinese bargaining position because the U.N. 
wished Beijing could constrain upon Pyongyang in exchange for the admission. On July 
1, for example, Panikkar connected the need to localize the Korean conflict with 
Beijing’s U.N. seat.
  
48 In an official reply approved by Mao on July 9, Zhou conveyed 
general agreement with the Indian above point.49
China’s two goals were contradictory. Joining the U.N. meant acquiescing in U.N. 
forces’ deployment in Korea. China claimed it was assisting Korea but at the same time 
attempted to acknowledge the legitimacy of the U.N, which inevitably undermined its 
deterrence credibility. However, Beijing seemed to never have understood the 
 However, in Chinese eyes, localization 
of the Korean War meant a “Korean Civil War” without any intervention of great powers 
from the outside. When North Korea forces outflanked South Korean troops in July, 
Beijing wished to get the U.N. admission and see Communist victory over the Korean 
peninsula simultaneously.   
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contradiction. Zhou publicly criticized the Chinese Nationalists and tried to replace them 
in the U.N., while on the other hand, he condemned U.N. military operations in Korea. 
For example, in a public statement on September 24, he stated that the “[U.N.] has 
already been degenerated into a tool for the U.S. government to cover up its intentions of 
invading China and enlarging the war [in Korea]. Peace-loving people around the world 
should not sit idly by these crimes.”50
The mixed signals did not work well. As General Bradley argued, “it was 
especially difficult to sort out [Red China’s] real intentions from propagandistic 
threats.”
  
51 To U.S. policymakers, China’s acknowledgement of the legitimacy of the U.N. 
resolutions indicated abandonment of North Korean interests. As the CIA concluded on 
September 8, “Chinese Communist intervention would probably eliminate all prospects 
for China’s admission to the United Nations.”52 This inference was immediately 
supported by Secretary Acheson on September 10, who confidently alleged that “it would 
be sheer madness on the part of the Chinese Communists to do that [intervene in Korea],” 
considering “why they should want to further their own dismemberment [in the United 
Nations]?”53
                                                          
50 JGYLZELWG, Vol. III, pp. 219-220. 
 The Consul General in Hong Kong on September 23 offered his opinion that 
“signs of Peking’s [Beijing’s] paramount interest in gaining entry to UN were Chou 
[Zhou] Enlai’s telegrams to UN branding as violation of charter Security Council’s 
rejection of demand for admission Chinese Communist representative and demanding 
unseating Nationalist delegation in assembly in favor Chinese Communists. Editorials on 
51 Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair, A General’s Life: An Autobiography (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1983), p. 
561.  
52 “Intelligence Memorandum 324, 8 September 1950, Probability of Direct Chinese Communist Intervention in 
Korea,” in Kuhns, ed., Assessing the Soviet Threat, p. 435.  
53 “Foreign Policies Toward Asia: A Television Interview with Secretary Acheson, Released to the press September 10,” 
in DSB, Vol. 23, No. 585, p. 463. 
20 
 
[the] UN in Peking People’s Daily and Hong Kong Wen Hui Pao lent support to view that 
Peking making all-out effort get into U.N.”54
 
 Washington then reached the conclusion 
that China’s determination to join the U.N. outweighed interests in protecting North 
Korea, mistakenly inferring that crossing the 38th parallel would not elicit PRC 
retaliation.  
Ambiguous Words: Border Defense as Noises 
Apart from the two conflicting pressing demands, China’s signals included a third 
condemn: protests against air and violations of PRC territory. A typical mixed signal was 
Zhou’s public accusation on August 30, condemning American intrusions in China’s 
airspace but also called Washington to withdraw from Korea.55 Zhou’s prime concern 
was indeed North Korea, manifested in his urging the U.N. to “apply sanctions against 
U.S. aggressive war crimes, and immediately withdraw all the forces from Korea, 
including the air and naval forces.”56 But was violation of Chinese territory really 
harmful to RRC’s vital interests? Indeed, protests against U.S. border violations were 
propaganda efforts to show that China was a “victim” of U.S. “aggression”. Mao 
therefore expressed impatience over the protests. On September16, he stated in internal 
discussions that “it will be a nuisance to protest each time an incursion occurs. It seems 
more appropriate to make one protest every ten days or two weeks over all the incursions 
that have occurred during that period.”57
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However, the mixed signals complicated U.S. interpretations of Chinese interests. 
Washington deduced that, since territorial violations aroused protests, Beijing would not 
mind operations beyond its border, although it might intervene. Contrary to China’s 
expectation, warnings regarding North Korea were treated as noise. On September 15, the 
CIA noted that “decisive Chinese Communist intervention, either direct or indirect, is 
thus unlikely. [C]harges of U.S. border violations and aggression [f]it into the ‘peace’ 
propaganda campaign.”58 Washington consequently assumed that the Yalu River was the 
bottom line, and therefore disregarded China’s extended deterrent threats and crossed the 
38th parallel. Alan Goodrich Kirk, U.S. ambassador to Moscow, judged on September 30 
that “Chinese Communists, through propaganda [i]n the hope of bluffing the U.N. on the 
38th parallel issue.”59 After analyzing Zhou’s speech on September 30, CIA handed in a 
report on October 6 suggesting that China’s warnings were “an attempt of bluff the U.N. 
into not crossing the 38th parallel, rather than a forewarning of Chinese intervention.”60
 
  
Ambiguous Actions: Delayed Assistance 
The advance of U.S. forces soon vanquished North Korean resistance following 
the Inchon Landing on September 15. As Matvei Vasilevich Zakharov, Soviet 
representative in Pyongyang, reported on September 26, the situation left him extremely 
pessimistic and defense of Seoul and Pusan was nearly hopeless.61
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send to the 38th parallel, and new divisions would be poorly equipped.62 Indeed, Kim 
was left with less than four divisions by October 20.63
Washington took Beijing’s non-involvement in Korea following September 15 as 
unwillingness to intervene. Had China fought back when General MacArthur was 
successful and defended the 38th parallel, more time would have been seized for North 
Koreans to retreat from the south. China was more than prepared by then, as the U.S. 
understood this. By mid-September, at least 250,000 troops had been deployed along the 
Sino-Korean border, many of them armed with Soviet military equipment, and they had 
trained in this area for nearly three months. China’s war preparation effort, albeit 
unconfirmed and imprecise, had been noted by the U.S. However, China chose to keep 
quiet. On September 20, it did nothing but praise Kim’s brave and courageous fighters.
  
64
China came to realize that extended deterrent attempts might come to naught in 
late September. Zhou on September 29 explicitly reminded Mao that “there is no [North 
Korean] military force beyond the [38th] parallel. [Therefore,] there is a possibility that 
the enemy will directly attack and occupy Pyongyang.”
  
65 Although Mao would have 
preferred to strengthening China’s extended deterrent posture, his assertion that “we have 
decided to send some of our troops [several divisions] to Korea” on October 1 was not 
sent to Moscow.66
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option is not to intervene, [at least] temporarily, and then to have further preparations.”67
More importantly, China still signaled nothing publicly about its military 
preparations to the U.S., showing a tendency of “standing idly by.” Washington, on 
reasonable grounds, predicted Beijing’s intervention, if any, should have been prior to 
U.S. military achievements South of the 38th line. Director of the Office of Northeast 
Asian Affairs on August 12, before the Inchon Landing, argued that “when U.N. forces 
begin to have military successes, then will be the time to look for [e]ntry of Chinese 
Communist forces.”
 
Two alternatives offer explanations. Chinese leadership in general might accept 
deterrence failure, and Mao was in purist of substantial Soviet aid before intervention.  
68 However this expectation was never confirmed by China’s words 
and deeds. On China’s side, nothing changed, except that time passed. Consequently, 
Washington believed that Beijing might not intervene at all. Upon receiving Zhou’s 
warnings on October 2, General J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, 
disregarded the message. As he recalled, “if the Chinese were serious, they would 
disclose their intentions in advance.”69 Also, on October 3, Walter Bedell Smith—the 
head of the CIA—reported to the White House that “there are no convincing indications 
of an actual Chinese Communist intention to resort to full-scale intervention in Korea. 
[F]rom a military standpoint, [t]he most favorable time militarily for intervention [when 
we had hanging on in the Pusan perimeter] had passed.”70 As some U.S. diplomats later 
pointed out, “Zhou’s October message to the US was not credited. [T]he message came 
too late.”71
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Ambiguous Actions: Hidden Military Maneuvers  
From June to October, Beijing mobilized hundreds of thousands of troops along 
the Sino-Korean border. However, not a word slipped out to the media. On July 7, 
Chinese leaders sent two CORPS [39th and 40th] to the Sino-Korean border.72 On July 
22, Mao deployed 124 MiG jet fighters to protect Chinese military maneuvers and 
industrial bases.73 Meanwhile, Zhou reported to Mao that three CORPS were moving to 
the border with three additional anti-aircraft regiments.74 On August 27, Mao additionally 
instructed that China should assemble 12 CORPS for emergency.75 On September 8, Mao 
gave further directives on the northward movement of the entire Ninth Army.76
Consequently, Washington never managed to realize the gravity of China’s 
deterrent signals. China’s first decisive warning came from Nie Rongzhen, the Deputy 
Chief of the General Staff, on September 25. Nie told Panikkar: “We know what we are 
in for, but [at] all costs American aggression has to be stopped.” However, Nie told 
Panikkar in “a quiet and unexcited manner.” Inferring from this manner and Nie’s 
omission of China’s military retaliation, Panikkar thought his words did not mean what 
 No sign 
of military movements appeared in any propaganda or in private talks with diplomats 
except the Soviets.  
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they literally meant.77 The second and most important warning came from Zhou at 
midnight on October 2, who warned that “American intrusion into North Korea would 
encounter Chinese resistance.”78
Because Beijing’s concealed mobilization did not effectively communicated, it 
could not signal its commitment to retaliate. First, Washington was confused over the 
direction of Chinese military mobilization. On September 12, according to the 
Netherlands Chargé d’Affaires in Beijing, “as example their conflicting natures said 
200,000 troops reported moving northward and over 50,000 moving south in direction 
Indochina border. [A]bsolutely no reports from Peking Charge confirming these reported 
troop movements towards Manchurian-Korean border.”
 According to Chinese and Indian sources, Zhou gave no 
details of what kinds of resistance and retaliatory measures China would employ, be they 
military counterattacks or other serious measures.  
79 Even as late as September 27, 
Washington still could not understand how and when Beijing had mobilized its troops. 
State Department officials had to admit that “there is nonetheless no guarantee that the 
Chinese Communist effort will not be thrust forth in another direction, toward the north 
or south, or at least toward the occupation of Quemoy and Matzu [islands in the 
South].”80
Second, Washington found no confirmation of Chinese military maneuvers from 
its deterrent signals, and thus doubted Chinese intention to intervene. Indeed, while 
Washington had expected to receive a Chinese message on military movements as U.S. 
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troops approached the 38th parallel.81 Washington therefore on September 8 concluded 
that Chinese actions in Korea would be “more indirect.”82 On October 3, upon receiving 
Zhou’s warning, the CIA estimated that Beijing “would not consider it in their interests to 
intervene openly in Korea if, as now seems likely, they anticipate that war with the U.N. 
nations would result.”83
 
  
TESTING COMPETING THEORIES 
 
Balance of Interests? 
BOI argues that “the salience of a particular region for a major power’s national 
interests indicates the inherent credibility of its (Defender’s) threat to retaliate if another 
major power (Challenger) attacks the third nation (Protégé) is located, such as political-
military, diplomatic and alliance ties, or the degree of economic interdependence.”84 The 
defender thus has a high chance of winning deterrence in this case, however, failed. 
Though asymmetric interests highly favored Beijing, Washington did not perceive this 
advantage, and assumed that “legitimate Chinese interests were in no way threatened by 
U.S. action in Korea,” if it crossed the 38th parallel. 85
This denial of Beijing’s interests did not come overnight. From July to August, 
Washington gave every credit to Beijing’s vital interests in the area. Any move beyond 
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the 38th parallel was taken with great care. On July 22, the State Department’s Policy 
Planning Staff submitted a report stating that “if U.N. forces were to continue military 
ground action north of the 38th parallel, [t]he danger of conflict with Chinese 
communists [w]ould be greatly increased. [W]e should make every effort to restrict 
military ground action to the area south of the 38th parallel.”86 President Truman 
approved a policy statement in the NSC (National Security Council) meeting at the end of 
August that “no ground operations were to take place north of 38th parallel in the event 
of Soviet or Chinese Communist entry.”87
The challenger’s vigilance, alas, did not seal the defender’s deterrent attempt with 
success. After receiving ambiguous signals from Beijing, Washington began to question 
the credibility of China’s threats, and eventually discredited Beijing’s focus on the 38th 
parallel. According to Panikkar, Zhou on July 21 made it quite clear that “Chinese had 
every intention of avoiding implication in present hostilities [in Korea].”
  
88 This report 
was considered valid by the U.S. even in late September. Secretary Acheson recalled that, 
during September, “we continued to seek evidence of Chinese interventions toward 
Korea. [P]anikkar reported Chou [Zhou] En-lai as emphasizing China’s peaceable 
intentions, in which the Indian agreed.”89 On September 21, Panikkar commented that 
Zhou “has continuously emphasized peaceful intentions. [A]s regards Korea, they have 
shown no undue interest beyond expression of sympathy. [I]n the circumstances direct 
participation of China in Korean fighting seems beyond range of possibility. [I]’m 
satisfied that China by herself will not interfere in the conflict.”90
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Americans generally agreed with their Indian counterparts. On none of these occasions, 
did Washington hit on China’s real stance on intervention. Therefore, vigilance was 
abandoned and deterrence failed.   
 
Balance of Capabilities?  
BOC believes that relative capability plays a significant role in deterrence 
outcomes. In Korea’s case, Washington’s underestimation of the possibility of defeat by 
Beijing’s military capabilities contributed to the PRC’s deterrence failure.91
Although Washington’s evaluation varied significantly, top-secret reports tell us 
that the Truman Administration always believed in China’s capability to intervene. The 
actual number of Chinese troops along the border was 250,748 by the end of July, 
consisting of four CORPS [38th, 39th, 40th and 42nd].
 Did the U.S. 
really underestimate Beijing’s capabilities and ignore Beijing’s signals, however?  
92  On the other side, American 
estimated of their number were also frightening. On July 6, at a NSC meeting, Secretary 
of the Army Frank Pace said that it was estimated there were two hundred thousand 
Chinese Communist troops in Manchuria.93 On the same day, the joint intelligence 
committee estimated that there were 565,000 Chinese communist troops in Manchuria. 
General Charles A. Willoughby, General Macarthur’s intelligence chief, estimated that 
there were 489,000 in Manchuria and 176,000 in North China, a quarter of them 
[115,000] “regulars”, the other three quarters “militia”.94
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 Later, Beijing increased the number of troops again, and Washington perceived 
the threat. On August 31, Zhou proposed that 700,000 troops in 11 Armies [36 divisions] 
were insufficient, so reserves of 100,000 veterans were called up.95 On September 3, 
Zhou submitted a written report on preparing 200,000 troops as reserves, which Mao 
approved.96 On the American side, the Department of the Army estimated on August 30 
that the total of Chinese regular forces might be approximately 256,000, comprising nine 
armies of 37 divisions.97 General Willoughby reported the total of regulars had doubled 
again to 450,000 by August 31.98 On September 8, the CIA estimated that there were 
“approximately 565,000 Military District [soldiers] in Manchuria.”99 U.S. field 
commanders, though achieving military success following the Inchon Landing, found it 
more scared when they noted that three Chinese army groups with a total of twenty-seven 
divisions, on a rough estimate between 250,000 and 300,000 troops, had been deployed 
up to the Yalu River.100
The failure of PRC deterrence cannot be attributed to insufficient capability 
because in reality, the U.S. did not underestimate China’s capabilities, and had engaged in 
a worst case scenario on China’s ability to intervene. Rather deterrence failure reflected 
U.S. assessment of the PRC resolve. On June 30, the CIA assessed China as “not likely” 
to launch military operations in Korea, although capable of doing so.
 In a nutshell, Washington took Beijing’s military maneuvers quite 
seriously.   
101
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mistakenly concluded on July 7 “reported movements of large troop formations from 
South and Central China toward the Northeast are largely discounted.”102 As General 
Bradley testified on China’s intentions, “we had the information that they [Chinese 
Communists] had capability, [b]ut we did not have any intelligence to the positive effect 
that they were going to intervene.”103
 
 Therefore, BOC has insufficient explanatory power 
for the extended deterrence failure.  
CONCLUSIONS 
 
It is apparent that in China’s extended deterrent attempts in 1950, ambiguous 
words and deeds were the factors that directly undermining credibility. The threats of 
intervention, supposed to be powerful, were diluted by the issue of U.N. admission issue 
and protests against border violations. Moreover, Beijing’s delay in taking military action 
let go the last chance to strengthen extended deterrent effect. Even after losing this 
chance, Beijing was still unsure whether to present its military forces as a demonstration 
of its political determination. Ambiguity led to disagreements in Washington on Beijing’s 
intentions, even though Chinese interests and military capabilities were acknowledged. 
Signaling techniques therefore offer a more convincing explanation than BOI or BOC in 
this case. 
 
CHINA’S CLEAR-CUT SIGNALS IN 1965 
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CHINA’S SIGNALS AND U.S. DETERRABILITY 
 
A crucial debate over this case must be settled. Some scholars deny the deterrent 
relationship among Beijing, Washington, and Hanoi in 1965.104 However, as will be 
discussed later, U.S. had intention to escalate the Vietnam War in 1965 even under 
China’s threats, while was deterred out of the land invasion. Dean Rusk, U.S. Secretary 
of State, recalled that “the chances of Chinese intervention were high, and for that reason 
I strongly opposed U.S. ground operations against North Vietnam. [T]he possibility of 
Chinese intervention definitely influenced how we fought this war.”105
Current scholarship in explaining China’s deterrence success, despite having 
merits, is insufficient. James Hershberg and Chen Jian described China’s signals through 
diplomatic channels to Washington in 1965.
  
106 Successful as their descriptions might be, 
the above question could not be fully answered if without examining how China signaled 
nonverbal messages. Some scholars, such as Yuen Foong Khong, view this case within a 
historical context, arguing that China’s repeated references to the Korean War in its 
signals trapped U.S. in its own fears. 107
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China’s reputation in this the case, but had he considered the disparity between the clear 
signals in 1965 and the ambiguous ones in 1950, the answer would be different.  
In this case, North Vietnam was China’s protégé, and was threatened by the 
Johnson Administration, whose primary concerns were to maintain South Vietnam and 
avoid a confrontation with China. As Defense Secretary Robert McNamara concluded on 
20 July 1965, “We want to create these conditions, if possible, without causing the war to 
expand into one with China [a]nd in a way which preserves support [o]f our allies and 
friends.”108 For the US, maintaining South Vietnam as a non-communist state was part of 
an undeniable responsibility to protect all Southeast Asia against Communist infiltration. 
As a memorandum by NSC on February 7 emphasized that “The stakes in Vietnam are 
extremely high. [T]he internal prestige of the United States, and a substantial part of our 
influence, are directly at risk in Vietnam. There is no way of unloading the burden on the 
Vietnamese themselves.”109 The other goal that Washington endeavored to achieve was to 
avert a direct military confrontation with China.  President Johnson issued a caveat 
against “the use of American ground troops in Asia” on February 10.110
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The United States was deterrable. As a memorandum by a NSC Staffer stated on 
10 February 1965 the fundamental question was whether South Vietnam was “really 
worth the high probability of a land war with China.”111 The answer was given by 
President Johnson on February 17, who stated that he sought “no wider war”.112 China’s 
deterrent efforts gained full success by the end of July 1965, as indicated by President 
Johnson’s rejection of any proposal of further escalation—particularly advancing beyond 
the 17th parallel. At a White House meeting on July 22, the President stated that, “If we 
gave Westmoreland all he asked for what are our chances? I don’t agree that [C]hina 
won’t come in.”113 He turned down the proposal “to destroy North Vietnam utterly and 
totally by unleashing the full might of America’s war power” on July 27.114 One month 
later, Chinese leaders acknowledged the success of deterrence. On August 20, Zhou 
informed Zambian delegates optimistically that the “Vietnam War will not be escalated 
into a world war, and if this is true, Vietnam is able to withstand the suffering. The United 
States cannot win this round against China, so other countries will not be involved.”115
 
 
By this point, Chinese leaders, although still concerned about the security of North 
Vietnam, had achieved their major goal—maintaining Hanoi as a security buffer.  
CLEAR-CUT SIGNALS 
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Unlike its deterrent efforts in the Korean case, China chose maximum clarity this 
time to deter a ground war in North Vietnam. It implemented a series of measures, overt 
and covert to enhance its credibility of its threats by, for example, emphasizing its 
interests through public statements and diplomacy, substantial military aid to Hanoi, and 
military maneuvers along the Sino-Vietnamese border.  
 
Clear-cut words: Propagandistic Threats over Specific Interests 
China had been alarmed about war extension to the North, especially when the 
Johnson Administration dispatched ground forces in the South in February 1965.  On 
February 23, Zhou publicly asserted that “[the Johnson Administration is] intending to 
extend the war beyond the border of South Vietnam.”116 China’s bottom line was 
defending the border of North Vietnam—the 17th parallel, which was apparent in this 
verbal signal. If U.S. ignored the warnings, China would resort to force and send massive 
numbers of military personnel to Vietnam. During his visit to Albania, on March 29, 
Zhou publicly warned that China would “dispatch its own personnel to fight hand in hand 
with Vietnamese people when they need.”117 Correspondingly, on April 20, the Sixth 
Enlarged Session of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC) 
adopted a resolution: “China will continue to do everything in its power to give resolute 
and unreserved support to the Vietnamese people.”118 Apart from its own media, the 
message was passed to the diplomats. On May 15, Zhou told the Soviet ambassador that, 
“We will not sit idly by if the United States extends the war to Indochina.”119
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confided in Amin al-Hafiz, Prime Minister of the Syrian Arab Republic, on June 9 that 
“China is threatened by the enlargement of the Vietnam War. [But] We will never subject 
ourselves to this kind of threat.”120
U.S. policymakers understood China’s interests at stake. On February 12, George 
Ball, Under Secretary of State, and Llewellyn Thompson, Ambassador at Large, reported 
to President Johnson that “Red China would be extremely reluctant to permit Hanoi to 
suffer unconditional surrender.”
 China’s deterrent efforts through diplomatic channels 
could not be ignored, despite these messages might not be transferred to the U.S. 
121 When China escalated its deterrent posture, 
Washington consequently perceived China’s threats. In a report by NIE (National 
Intelligence Estimate) on May 5, Washington inferred that Beijing’s primary interest was 
Indochina, and Chinese leaders “have been making preparations for at least limited 
engagement, and we believe that they should be prepared to risk a major military conflict 
with the U.S. should they feel China’s vital security interests threatened by U.S. 
actions.”122
Based on this understanding, Washington scrutinized Chinese propaganda to find 
out how Beijing would protect its protégé, because “CHICOMs (Chinese Communists) 
will make every effort through propaganda and diplomatic moves to halt U.S. attacks 
directed against North Vietnam;” and “would feel an increased compulsion to take some 
dramatic action to counter the impact of U.S. pressures.”
  
123
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informed National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundythat “Peiping (Beijing) has been its 
usually unpleasant self, but nothing momentous to note [t]hat we have ‘erased’ the 17th 
parallel as a demarcation line.”124 Having analyzed Chinese propaganda for months, a 
White House paper on April 1 reached a conclusion that “Peiping [Beijing] has stiffened 
its position within the last week. We still believe that attacks near Hanoi might 
substantially raise the odds of Peiping coming in with air.”125 On April 9, intelligence 
agencies additionally reported China’s public statements were to “deter the U.S. from 
extending its bombing and increasing its forces in the area.” “[China’s] willingness to go 
as far as to threaten intervention suggest that the Communists are prepared to take some 
further steps to fulfill their warnings with token numbers of ‘volunteers’ from other 
Communist countries.”126
 
 
Clear-cut Actions: Aid Policy 
China’s aid to North Vietnam, as part of its clear-cut signals to show 
determination, threatened Washington with the prospect of massive intervention by 
substantial ground forces. China tried to obtain two objectives—its military aid not only 
enhanced North Vietnam’s military effectiveness, but also strengthened its position for 
ground military operations in Indochina.  
China’s aid policy was acknowledged by the U.S. According to Pentagon 
publications, in December 1964, Chinese weapons, including 57mm. and 75mm. 
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recoilless rifles, dual-purpose machineguns, rocket launchers, large mortars and antitank 
mines, were delivered to South Vietnam.127 And Chinese military aid to North Vietnam in 
1965 was as much as ten times that in 1964—the number of guns, artillery, cartridges, 
shells, and motors, had increased by more than 200%, 133%, 160%, 350%, and 250% 
respectively.128 China’s aid effectively optimized North Vietnamese armaments: “the 
strength of artillery units doubled that of 1964 and two armored regiments were also 
established.” By May 1965, Vietnamese air-defense artillery units “expanded from 12 
regiments and 14 battalions to 21 regiments and 41 battalions.”129
Washington admitted the military impasse caused by Beijing’s full support. 
Intelligence agencies reported on April 21 that Beijing’s aid had boosted Hanoi’s 
determination to “ride out the U.S. bombardment” and “afford further punishment.”
  
130 
Secretary McNamara acknowledged the difficulties four days later, stating that even 
without Beijing’s intervention with substantial ground forces [only material aid], winning 
the Vietnam War would be a “long and difficult road.”131 In addition, a SNIE (Special 
National Intelligence Estimate) report concluded at the end of April that “[DRV and 
China] apparently calculate that the DRV can afford further punishment.”132
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Later, Beijing also realized that its aid enabled Hanoi to resist further United 
States escalation. Zhou delivered a talk on the deterrent effect on May 21, asking: “Will 
the worst scenario [North Vietnam being invaded] come in an instant? No. That would 
happen gradually. We all clearly know that our enemy is stalled (qishang baxia). U.S. 
started the air strikes against North Vietnam last August and they have lasted for three 
months now, but right now it encounters new difficulties. [Washington’s] Achilles’ heel is 
its ignorance [of the next step].”133
 
 
Clear-cut Actions: Military Maneuvers 
Apart from military assistance to North Vietnam, China also prepared for an all-
out attack by the U.S. It dispatched four divisions of the Guangzhou military and air 
forces along the Sino-Vietnamese border after August 1964.134 By August 12, several air 
force units in the Southern Chinese provinces—Guangdong, Zhejiang, Guangxi and 
Hainan—were mobilized. Also, new airports were constructed in Guangxi, Yunnan and 
Guizhou to speed up the redeployment of available fighters along the Sino-Vietnamese 
border.135
U.S. intelligence agencies observed China’s clear-cut troop mobilizations along 
the Sino-Vietnamese border. According to the SNIE of 4 February 1965, Washington had 
noticed “the introduction of 50 odd-jet fighters into North Vietnam and the increase of 
Chinese air strength in the border area from 150 jet fighters to about 350.” Therefore 
Washington assumed that Beijing was expecting “that these deployments will help deter 
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the U.S. from expanding the war to North Vietnam.”136 On February 8, Senator Mike 
Mansfield “raised the questions about possible Chinese intervention,” as he noticed a 
recent completed airfield in North Vietnam, and concluded that “an increase in at least 
indirect Chinese intervention is to be anticipated.”137
These observations, in combination with China’s explicit propaganda, stimulated 
U.S. fear of China’s massive intervention with substantial ground forces. From the 
perspective of China’s signals, escalating and sustaining U.S. bombing could not 
eliminate the risk of Chinese intervention, let alone further escalation of ground warfare 
in North Vietnam. On February 13, having witnessed Chinese military mobilization, Ball 
evaluated the potential for costly U.S.-China military confrontation, and passed to 
President Johnson these estimates, in which he fully acknowledged the considerable 
pressures Washington had to face from Beijing’s move of “massive ground forces into 
North Viet-Nam.” He estimated that Beijing had the capacity to “support 14 Chinese 
divisions and 8 North Vietnamese divisions,” which would require Washington to “bring 
in 5 to 8 United States divisions with a total troop strength of 300,000 men.” In 
conclusion, Ball suggested President Johnson highlight the possibility of Chinese massive 
intervention and thus “confine strikes to targets.”
  
138
Consequently, in the first half of 1965, Washington yielded to Chinese threats of 
large-scale troop intervention. On March 1, Adlai Stevenson, U.N. Ambassador, told 
 On February 17, Vice President 
Humphrey submitted a memorandum to the President, emphasizing that “confrontation 
with the Chinese Air Force can easily lead to massive [ground] retaliation.”  
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President Johnson and Secretary Rusk the risks of “appearance of substantial Chicom 
forces as ‘volunteers’ in North Vietnam” would be high.139  Therefore, it was 
understandable that Senator Mansfield expressed support for President Johnson’s 
rejection of bombing Hanoi-Haiphong on June 5, which might lead to “extension of the 
war in Asia,” because “the bombing is likely to insure the irreversibility of the Chinese 
involvement.”140
 
  
TESTING COMPETING THEORIES 
 
Balance of Interests? 
With Status-quo powers such as Washington and Beijing, BOI argues that neither 
of them had the intention to cross the 17th parallel and that deterrence success reflected 
this common interest.141 From the U.S. side, having compared the cost of a land war 
against China with its interests in North Vietnam, President Johnson eventually abjured 
the latter. From China’s perspective, interests in South Vietnam were not vital enough to 
risk a war. Zhou assured Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin on 5 February 1965 in Beijing 
that, “we don’t want the escalation of war. …we don’t want a local war to turn into a 
world war.”142
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First, the compatible Sino-American interests in Vietnam could not be a cause of 
extended deterrent success. President Johnson chose to avoid a war instead of protecting 
U.S. interests in Vietnam, but that by no means showed that its interests were low. 
America’s interest in North Vietnam was so high that Washington had been at some point 
quite determined to conquer Hanoi. Once defending South Vietnam outweighed the 
desire to avoid a war with China, Washington might have to cross the 17th parallel. For 
example, a report by William P. Bundy, the Chairman of the NSC Working Group on 
Southeast Asia, advocated defending South Vietnam by “defeating North Viet-Nam and 
probably Communist China militarily.”143 The NSC also suggested on 24 November 
1964 that U.S. aims were indeed unlimited, and it was “determined to continue escalating 
its pressures to achieve its announced objectives [i.e. in South Vietnam] regardless of the 
danger of war with Communist China.”144
Second, BOI is insufficient to explain the greater concern after Washington 
received Beijing’s signals. On 11 February 1965, SNIE analysis discussed the increasing 
possibility of China’s “introduction of large-scale ground force combat units into North 
Vietnam,” stating that “if the U.S. program continued and inflicted severe damage on 
North Vietnam, the chances of such a movement would rise.”
  
145 On June 12, the CIA 
assessed the possibility of an intervention “with ground forces in a substantial fashion”, 
and argued that its likelihood would surge “if U.S. ground forces invaded North 
Vietnam.”146
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apprehensive over the chance of a confrontation. Had Beijing not signaled the criticality 
of the 17th parallel clearly and intensely, the United States would have advanced in North 
Vietnam. Signaling therefore contributed to China’s deterrence success.  
 
Balance of Capabilities?  
Many scholars have applied BOC to seek an answer for the extended deterrent 
success. For example, Allen Whiting argues that China’s deterrent threats were credible 
due to U.S. considerations of Chinese military capability.147 In such efforts, BOC shows 
considerable explanatory power. For instance, the question why Washington feared a 
confrontation before Beijing initiated its deterrent policy seems almost self-evident. On 
24 May 1964, the Department of Defense estimated that Beijing and Hanoi had the 
capabilities to deploy 95,000 troops (9 divisions) in the wet season (May—November) 
and some 250,000 troops with more armor and artillery in the dry season in Southeast 
Asia, and “ could simultaneously deploy up to 7 infantry divisions into Burma.”148 
Having acknowledged China’s capability to wage a ground war, on 10 February 1965, a 
NSC memorandum stated that it would be “folly” to “lead us into a land war with China 
in which our air and naval power would be relatively ineffective.” 149
However, BOC is insufficient to answer all the questions regarding the success of 
deterrence. Why, for instance, did Washington disbelieve in massive and immediate 
intervention by Beijing in the mid-1964? In May 1964, a SNIE report concluded that 
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“Communist China almost certainly would not wish to become involved in hostilities 
with U.S. forces. It would accordingly proceed with caution, and though it would make 
various threatening gestures.”150 Meanwhile, although President Johnson appeared to be 
more concerned with China’s threats, almost all of his senior advisers, including Rusk, 
McNamara, and Bundy, preferred to war escalation in Vietnam.151
In this case, China had placed clear-cut signals at the center of its deterrent policy. 
A notable example came when Luo Ruiqing, the PLA (People’s Liberation Army) Chief 
of Staff, announced on 10 May 1965: “[We] are also prepared to send our men to fight 
together with the people of Vietnam. Our opposition to U.S. imperialism has always been 
clear-cut.” 
 Viewed from a 
signaling perspective, the answer is that China had not signaled its military maneuvers by 
then. Military advantage cannot speak for itself, but needs to be demonstrated by signals 
to be understood as expected.  
152 As Zhou explained publicly on May 28, “with only 14 million people, 
South Vietnam can defeat 200,000 American troops. China’s population is 50 times more 
than that of South Vietnam. We can defeat 10 million American troops.”153
The result proved that the contribution of clear-cut signals to BOC cannot be 
ignored. U.S. estimates of China’s intent spiked in mid-1965 after Beijing publicized its 
military maneuvers, and the Johnson Administration was much more determined to avoid 
a confrontation. On June 5, Senator Mansfield argued with Secretary McNamara’s 
estimate—around 300,000 Americans had to be deployed to deal with Hanoi’s forces if 
they advanced south—that: “If the expansion goes on to include combat with Chinese 
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forces all over Southeast Asia, we had better start thinking in terms of millions.”154 On 
June 24, Edmund Rice, Consul General in Hong Kong, made similar suggestions that 
Washington should “learn what the limits of our capabilities are without getting into a 
wider and disastrous war.”155
As the result of China’s warnings and military deployment, President Johnson 
rejected proposals for further escalations at a series of White House meetings. On July 
22, according to Jack Valenti, a confidant of the President presenting at the conference, 
President Johnson was deterred because the fear of Chinese intervention never left him. 
General Harold Johnson, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, disregarded China’s military 
power in the afternoon, when was told by the President that China had plenty of 
divisions, around thirty-one, to move into North Vietnam. McNamara further added that, 
“It would take 300,000 plus what need to combat the VC (Viet Cong).”
  
156
 
  
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The North Vietnam case shows that clear-cut signaling was the hinge of China’s 
successful extended deterrent attempts. It forced Washington to fully comprehend 
Beijing’s political concerns and military power along the border. The Johnson 
Administration, especially the President himself, was deterred and China achieved its 
deterrent objectives. Interests and capabilities, although not unimportant, only perform 
through signaling.  
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CHINA’S AMBIGUOUS SIGNALS IN 1978 
 
CHINA’S SIGNALS AND VIETNAM’S DETERRABILITY 
 
In mid-1978, the Kampuchean-Vietnamese conflicts reached an apex. As Prince 
Sihanouk recalled, Khieu Samphan, Chair of the State Presidium of Democratic 
Kampuchea, aroused that “the Vietnamese would swallow it [Kampuchea] up, send 
millions of their citizens to colonize us, reducing our eight million [in fact, only five 
million] Cambodians to an entire minority: it would be the end of our race and our 
national sovereignty.”157 In December 1977, Phnom Penh had terminated diplomatic 
relations with Hanoi.158 Vietnam sought mediation from China. After the mediation 
failed, Vietnam claimed on 6 January 1978 that “no reactionary force [China] whatsoever 
can possibly break these [Kampuchean-Vietnamese] special relations of solidarity and 
friendship.”159 On the other hand, China began to tilt toward the Khmer Rouge. In 
January 1978, Deng Yingchao, Vice Chairperson of the NPC, stated publicly during her 
visit to Phnom Penh that “[Kampuchea] cannot be overwhelmed by any force.”160
Hanoi’s deterrability in 1978 is a critical issue needs to be settled, but 
unfortunately is still debatable. Scholars only have limited access to Vietnamese archives 
 At this 
point, an extended deterrent relationship emerged, with Vietnam as the challenger, China 
the defender and Kampuchea as China’s protégé. 
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and the calculations of the VCP (Vietnamese Communist Party) Politburo in 1978 were 
especially unclear, although in general, most secondary sources argue that Hanoi faced 
huge pressure over possible international implications of a war, especially the risk of 
direct Chinese intervention.161 There is a piece of evidence to demonstrate Hanoi’s 
deterrability. An all-out war with Kampuchea might invite China’s invasion of Laos, 
which had already been part of Vietnamese sphere of influence in 1977. In the view of 
Tran Quyen, a member of the VCP Central Committee, if Vietnam were to invade 
Kampuchea, China might occupy Laos.162
China aimed to deter Vietnam from launching an all-out invasion of Kampuchea. 
Its policy began with economic measures. On May 12, it cancelled twenty-one economic 
projects. It cancelled additional fifty-four projects in the following two weeks, and finally 
all the remaining projects on July 3. 
 There was no guarantee for Vietnamese 
military success in Kampuchea under this circumstance, but when Vietnam initiated the 
attack, it indeed needed to consider the price which it would have to pay. In conclusion, if 
loss aversion played a role in Vietnam’s strategic thinking, it was to Vietnam’s interests if 
it was deterrable. 
163 In addition, China closed Vietnam’s consulates in 
Guangzhou, Kunming and Nanning on June 16.164
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Soviet ambassador that Hanoi had set the goal “to solve fully this question [of 
Kampuchea] by the beginning of 1979,” because he predicted that China would not 
prevent changes inside Kampuchea unfavorable to it.165 Vietnam therefore decided to 
challenge Kampuchea despite pressures from China. Vietnam invaded Kampuchea in 
December 1978 and the Sino-Vietnamese confrontation finally began in February 1979. 
As Deng Xiaoping told Prince Sihanouk, “We must fight and keep fighting the 
Vietnamese until they are beaten and forced to evacuate your country completely and 
permanently.”166
 
 
AMBIGUOUS SIGNALS 
 
Some scholars argue that China resolutely supported Kampuchea both in words 
and in deeds, and vehemently proclaimed and repeatedly acted in support of its 
protégé.167
 
 However, a close look will prove that China’s words and deeds could hardly 
be considered “resolute.” First, China avoided directly conveying threats upon Vietnam’s 
Kampuchea policy which pushed Vietnam to align with the Soviet Union. Second, before 
Vietnam invaded Kampuchea, China’s support was an empty check, although military aid 
had been provided. Third, after Vietnam made the decision to initiate an all-out attack, 
China’s hidden military maneuvers were ineffective to change Vietnam’s mind, and thus 
cut the extended deterrence credibility.  
Ambiguous Words: Indirectness in Accusing Vietnam  
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China’s signals were indirectness in accusing Vietnam before August 1978. 
Although Li Xiannian, Chinese Vice Prime Minister, referred to Vietnam as a “regional 
hegemony” for the first time in Bangladesh on 18 March 1978, Chinese propaganda lines 
did not mention Li’s following words: “we are aware of the [Vietnamese] intention of 
creating a ‘Greater Indochina Federation’. [W]e urge [Vietnamese] to cease the invasion 
of Kampuchea immediately, withdraw its troops, and settle problems through peaceful 
negotiations.”168 China thought it could still be possible to appease Vietnam even though 
the extended deterrent relationship had emerged since January 1978. The omission of the 
words was reasonable on the Chinese side because Vo Nguyen Giap, Vietnam’s Defense 
Minister, sent a message on March 8 congratulating Xu Xiangqian on his appointment as 
Vice-premier and Defense Minister of the PRC.169
Moreover, China was in pursuit of driving a wedge between Vietnam and the 
Soviet Union, because it realized limits of Moscow-Hanoi cooperation. For instance, 
Huan Xiang, an outstanding Chinese diplomat, delivered a talk on June 14 in internal 
discussions. He criticized Vietnam’s ambitions in Southeast Asia, but also mentioned that 
“economic situations in Vietnam are difficult. [T]he Soviet Union is taking an advantage 
of the serious [Vietnam’s] problems for its own objectives.” According his speech, 
“[China] have tried to talk to them [Vietnamese] through internal channels in the past.”
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media in mid-1978 reported that “Soviet meddling and instigation is one of the principal 
factors that triggered the Vietnamese authorities’ current unbridled anti-Chinese and anti-
China campaign and their moves to poison relations with China.”171
The Chinese assessment of the Soviet-Vietnamese relations was correct given the 
Vietnamese limited willingness to fully cooperate with the Soviet Union in economic area 
before June 1978.
 China’s propaganda 
was not directly against Vietnam’s Kampuchea policy until the late August 1978.  
172
First, Hanoi admitted “[Chinese] threats and challenges” on June 19 but it made 
no concession on Kampuchea, claiming “the Vietnamese people are many, many times 
stronger than during the periods when our people defeated the biggest aggressive forces 
of all times such as the Yuan-Mongols in the past and the US imperialists in the recent 
years.”
 However, the correct assessment was helpless to extended deterrent 
efforts. China had two incompatible goals—deriving the wedge and deterring Vietnam. 
Accusing the Soviets diluted China’s major deterrent threats, and it can be inferred that 
Vietnam was reasonable to disbelieve China’s political resolve on Kampuchea. Although 
no direct evidence on Vietnamese perceptions of China’s signals can be presented, some 
indirect pieces do exist.  
173 Second, Vietnam discarded the unwillingness to fully cooperate with the Soviet 
Union in mid-1978 and from then on clung to Moscow. On June 15, the VCP Politburo 
requested permission for Le Duan to visit Soviet Union on June 21, emphasizing “the 
urgent necessity of carrying out timely consultations with the Soviet comrades.”174
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practice, Vietnam joined the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (COMECON) on 
June 29. Vietnam’s Vice Foreign Minister asserted immediately that “Vietnam is bound to 
take part in COMECON”.175
 
 China’s mixed verbal signals performed poorly and 
backfired by encouraging Vietnam’s alignment with the Soviet Union and more risk-
taking in Kampuchea.  
Ambiguous Actions: Hidden Military Aid 
China’s concern over the Khmer Rouge’s survival was a vital Chinese interest to 
break Soviet-Vietnamese encirclement. Hua Guofeng, CCP Chairman and Chinese Prime 
Minister, and Deng Xiaoping met with Son Sen, Khmer Rouge’s Defense Minister on 30 
July 1978. In internal discussions, China placed abundant military aid at Kampuchea’s 
disposal.176 Chinese leaders explicitly told their counterparts that “it is clear right now 
Kampuchean-Vietnamese conflicts are unusual: Vietnam intends to create an Indochinese 
Federation with the Soviet help.”177
However, China issued ambiguous signals by hiding its military aid. In summer 
1978, when a Kampuchean-Vietnamese border war was imminent, China did nothing 
publicly but praise the heroic Kampucheans for their fearlessness in defeating invaders. 
Even on the brink of deterrence failure on September 4, Chinese leaders were still silent 
about military aid, only saying that “Kampuchea has been subjected to enormous 
pressures but it is confidently standing towering in the East.”
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insisted on standing behind the stage, although Deng Xiaoping had made it clear that 
China would provide the Kampucheans with all military aid.179 In early November, Wang 
Dongxing, CCP Vice Chairman, paid a visit to Phnom Penh and Pol Pot proposed that 
“the government of Democratic Kampuchea and the CPK know that they can count on 
the help of the fraternal Chinese army if the need arises.” Although China had decided to 
mobilize troops along the border at this point, Pol Pot’s above paragraph was deleted and 
China only claimed vaguely that it would “help Kampucheans safeguard independence 
and territorial integrity”.180
Receiving such ambiguous signals, Hanoi audaciously pushed its war preparation 
forward. In June, according to an interview with Xuan Thuy, Vice-Chairman of Vietnam’s 
National Assembly, Vietnam underwent a major military buildup, reorienting its economy 
to the new security requirements, and reducing the army’s economic reconstruction 
role.
  
181 The VCP Central Secretariat issued an additional declaration on August 11 that 
Vietnamese civilians and military officials “should achieve the victory in the Southwest 
[along Kampuchean-Vietnamese border].”182 Le Duan made the decision for an all-out 
attack in September and never changed his mind since then. Although the Vietnamese 
Vice Foreign Minister admitted “the Khmer Rouges are assured they have 800 million 
Chinese behind them,” Vietnam still pressed ahead at the end of October 1978.183
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initiated the all-out attack in the following weeks regardless of China’s deterrent 
attempts.184
 
  
Ambiguous Actions: Hidden Military Maneuvers  
By September, a Kampuchean-Vietnamese war was approaching. As discussed 
before, in Le Duan’s private discussions with the Soviet ambassador in early September, 
Hanoi had set its heart on solving “fully this question [of Kampuchea] by the beginning 
of 1979”. Regarding China’s extended deterrent attempts, Le Duan stated that a Chinese 
offensive by land would be “very complex”, and the Chinese “haven’t managed to do 
anything so far.”185 Le Duan was correct, because Chinese policymakers were discussing, 
while made no decision to mount any military maneuver as signals to deter Vietnam’s 
potential attack in September.186
Only after Hanoi had decided to oust the Khmer Rouge did China send clearer 
verbal signals. Deng Xiaoping publicly linked China’s deterrent posture with Vietnam’s 
possible invasion of Kampuchea on November 8, asserting that whether China would 
resort to force depended on the extent to which Vietnam carried out aggression against 
Kampuchea.
 China’s insufficient political resolve on the use of force 
before Vietnam’s decision to attack Kampuchea was part of the reason of the deterrence 
failure.   
187 The Chinese propaganda additionally alleged on November 10 that “we 
[Chinese] people will see how far you [Vietnam] will go [in Kampuchea].”188
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Sino-Vietnamese border and claimed “Vietnam has become the Cuba of the East. [W]e 
should be vigilant and annihilate enemies.”189 Li Xiannian on the following day issued a 
warning that China had its limits.190
However, China lost the last chance to send clear-cut non-verbal signals by hiding 
military maneuvers. Chengdu and Guangzhou Military Regions (MR) sent troops to the 
Sino-Vietnamese border in November and December.
  
191 However, China tried to hide its 
intentions in a variety of ways. First, Xu Shiyou, the local commander-in-chief in 
Guangzhou MR, argued in private “there can never be too much deception in war (bingbu 
yanzha). [W]e should try our best to confuse our enemies.” Xu wished the Chinese 
military maneuvers might appear to be troop camping to Vietnamese intelligence 
agencies. He accordingly commanded his troops of Guangzhou MR to change license 
plates into Guangxi Military District. Second, above the brigade level, the PLA’s radio 
broadcasts were kept working as normal to confuse Vietnamese.192 Third, the PLA’s rail 
and road traffic moved at night, and Chinese governments imposed curfews. Sensitive 
areas in some China’s opened cities were temporarily closed again.193
China’s secret military maneuvers, as those before the intervention in Korea, 
could aim at initiating surprise attacks. However, the inconsistency of China’s words and 
actions—conveying verbal threats while secretly deploying troops—undermined the 
credibility. Van Tien Dung, PAVN (People’s Army of Vietnam) Chief of Staff, arrived in 
the fifth military region adjacent to Kampuchea on December 12, and required the 
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officials and soldiers there to achieve “any objective in the new stage”.194 General Giap 
on December 21 asserted that Vietnam “will adopt offensive strategies and take the 
advantages to defeat our enemies.” 195
 
 Four days later, Hanoi sent more than 100,000 
troops and occupied Phnom Penh in January 1979. No matter how clear China verbal 
signals were, they were useless due to the absence of demonstrating seriousness by 
announcing the military mobilization. 
TESTING COMPETING THEORIES 
 
Balance of Interests? 
BOI argues that China’s extended deterrence failure was due to asymmetric 
interests in Vietnam’s favor. Duiker for instance argues that, “to party leaders in Hanoi, 
[t]he ‘special relationship’ with Cambodia was not a negotiable issue but a matter of 
national survival.”196 Amer also takes a similar angle. “From a geo-strategic perspective 
these two countries [Laos and Kampuchea] are of paramount importance to Vietnam’s 
security, while they are of less importance to China.”197
This explanation might be convincing because BOI indeed favored Vietnam 
regarding Kampuchea. Form China’s perspective, it supported Kampuchea mainly to 
break the Soviet-Vietnamese encirclement. As Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Zhong 
Xidong claimed on 19 September 1978, “[The Soviet Union] needs the service of the 
Vietnam’s regional hegemonism and wants it to play the ‘role of an outpost in Southeast 
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Asia.’ The Soviet Union has the need to use Vietnam while Vietnam has the need of 
Soviet patronage, and such is the relationship between the two.”198
First, Vietnam had to break the Chinese-Kampuchean encirclement that it could 
not have been clearer that it was not merely playing with Kampuchea. Hanoi Radio stated 
on 21 February 1978 that “imperialists [U.S.] and international reactionaries [China] have 
helped [the Kampucheans] build up and equip overnight a dozen divisions armed with 
long-range artillery and war planes which Kampuchea did not have before 1975.”
 From Vietnam’s 
perspective, similarly, it needed to break the Chinese-Kampuchean encirclement. 
However, Vietnam also needed to deal with a belligerent Khmer Rouge regime along its 
border, which China did not have a similar concern.  
199 A 
secret document published by the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry in June 1978 clearly 
noted that “China had tried to limit Vietnamese influence in Laos and Cambodia by 
supporting those regimes that have opposed Vietnam.”200 On September 17, an article in 
Tap Chi Cong San, VCP’s theoretical journal, analyzed that “the reactionary Pol Pot-Ieng 
Sary clique is a lord-thirsty lackey clique badly needed by Chinese.”201 In December, the 
VCP’s fifth Plenum unanimously “pointed out the new difficulties caused by the Chinese 
reactionaries’ schemes and acts.”202
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reactionary clique [Pol Pot].”203 In Truong Chinh’s words, the Chairman of the 
Vietnamese National Assembly of Vietnam, saw “the problem of Kampuchea 
fundamentally as the problem of China.” He explicitly argued that “Vietnam is facing a 
two-prolonged aggression and was caught in a pincer movement, from the southwest the 
Pol Pot-Ieng Sary army, and from the north, by Chinese expansionism which was ready 
to across the border at any time.” Vietnam just had to “strike in the south, clear the north 
(danh nam, dep doc).”204
Second, Vietnam regarded establishing a “special relationship” with Kampuchea 
as especially vital, which were challenged by the Khmer Rouge. Le Duan asserted in May 
1975: “We pledge to strengthen the unshakable militant friendship between the 
Vietnamese people and the people in our two fraternal neighbor countries—Laos and 
Cambodia.”
 
205 As he additionally stated at the Fourth Party Congress in December 1976, 
“the three countries [Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea] have been associated with one 
another for ever in building and defense.”206 Nguyen Duy Trinh, Vietnam’s Foreign 
Minister, further elaborated that “the close solidarity between the three countries is of 
vital importance. [W]e will do all we can to safeguard and develop this special 
relationship.”207
Vietnamese vital interests had been threatened by Khmer Rouge’s hostile actions 
since mid-1975. The Vietnamese chargé d’affaires even directly told Prince Sihanouk in 
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August 1975 that “the Vietnam-Cambodia conflict had been started by [Cambodia] as an 
undeclared war. [T]he objective [of the Khmer Rouge] was to ‘occupy a large portion of 
South Vietnam along the Cambodian border and work toward exterminating the 
Vietnamese population.’”208 In April and September 1977, Kampuchean units, backed by 
artillery, crossed into Vietnam in force, slaughtering hundreds of local inhabitants and 
razing their villages. According to Vietnamese officials, nearly a thousand people were 
killed or suffered serious injuries.209 More than two thousand Vietnamese were killed and 
seventy-one thousand people evacuated from the frontier villages, abandoning some 
thirty-seven thousand acres of cultivable land between September 1977 and November 
1978.210 On 2 September 1977 Vietnamese diplomats in Phnom Penh even directly 
informed Pol Pot: “We have documentary evidence that you intend to take over Saigon 
and that you dream of dominating South Vietnam.”211
It is safe to conclude that BOI favored Vietnam instead of China, and additionally, 
it is correct for BOI to predict the deterrence failure. The theoretical perspective, 
nevertheless, is still insufficient because it leaves the timing of the all-out attack in 
December 1978 unexplained. Prior to the invasion, the Vietnam’s interests asymmetry 
with China was a constant factor over the Indochina peninsula in 1978, which could 
hardly explain Vietnam’s significant policy shifts during the year. Hanoi did take several 
counter-measures before the autumn of 1978, but none intended to topple the Khmer 
Rouge.
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Kampuchea, including ending military activities, border negotiations and international 
guarantee and supervision, a proposal reiterated on March 2.213 In the following two 
months, Hanoi issued several conflict resolution proposals to the U.N. to leave the 
Vietnamese unhurt.214 Xuan Thuy still claimed on July 29 that Vietnam was waiting for 
“an appropriate response from the Kampuchean authorities to its fair and reasonable 
proposal for negotiation.”215
 
  Although Vietnamese initiatives could have been diplomatic 
setup to demonstrate other options had been ineffective, it is evident that Hanoi was not 
provoked by asymmetric interests involved to invade Kampuchea in December 1978. 
BOI therefore is insufficient to explain aspects of this extended deterrence failure.  
Balance of Capabilities?  
BOC suggests that China’s deterrence failure was due to its inability to inflict 
unacceptable damage upon Vietnam. First, China’s deterrent attempts by military power 
were weak.216 Second, Kampuchean forces were also weak.217 Third, China’s deterrent 
threats were offset by the Vietnamese alliance with the Soviet Union. According to James 
Mulvenon, “the threat from Moscow was the most significant factor, for the Russians’ 
looming presence in the war reduced the credibility of Chinese threats of escalation, 
undermining a key pillar of successful coercive diplomacy.”218
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However, the first two claims are invalid, and the third one needs to be 
reevaluated. BOC actually favored China as the defender. First, Vietnam’s real military 
power was less powerful than Hanoi claimed in February and March 1979.219 The VCP 
was left with only five divisions along the Sino-Vietnamese border, four of them 
protecting Hanoi, albeit the Vietnamese were relatively well-equipped and well-
disciplined. Hanoi deployed a 70,000-man Border Security Force and an additional 
50,000 lightly armed militia troops, while there were more than 300,000 Chinese 
troops.220 During the war, China successfully destroyed over 300 Vietnamese villages, 
four sizeable towns, all the factories in the area, a railroad line, a power plant, and a 
phosphate mine—the country’s main source of fertilizer.221
Second, Khmer Rouge was highly dependent on China’s aid and protection, 
which Vietnam fully understood. China provided, repaired and refurbished 10,000 tons of 
military equipment, including 100 120-mm artillery pieces and 1,300 military vehicles.
 
222 
The actual military equipment China delivered included 2 fast gunships each over 800 
tons, 4 patrol boats, 200 tanks, 300 armored cars, 300 artillery pieces, six jet fighters, two 
bombers, and 30,000 tons of assorted ammunition.223
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Third, it is true that the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance was used as a deterrent 
message against potential Chinese invasion after the deterrence failure. As Tap Chi Cong 
San asserted, “the inevitable outcome of a military attack upon the USSR and the 
fraternal socialist countries closely linked to it…[w]ould be heavy retaliation.”224 Soviet 
leaders, such as General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, also admitted on November 3 that 
the treaty had already become a “political reality” and that “whether they [the Chinese] 
want it or not, they will have to reckon with this reality.”225
However, BOC’s explanation still cannot fully hold for two reasons. First, from 
May to September 1978, Moscow’s support had limited influence on Hanoi’s final 
decision to attack Kampuchea. A piece of evidence came from General Van Tien Dung’s 
arguments in VCP’s theoretical journal, addressing Vietnam’s strategic strengths and 
weaknesses. He argued that two factors related to Soviet support had not been achieved—
“the newly recognized and technically developed national armed forces” and 
“international support.”
 The treaty was therefore a 
political preparation for Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea.  
226 Until September Vietnam was still considered by Vietnamese 
leaders themselves as a weak secondary power. Second, Soviet aid to Vietnam in 
November and December 1978 was only “symbolic gesture” because only “20 MIG-24 
swept-wing fighter planes were on the route to Hanoi”.227
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China’s deterrent attempts.  
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In conclusion, two specific BOC arguments are mistaken, and the third is 
insufficient. Additionally, if the theory was correct, and BOC was indeed favorable to 
China, China could have won, but it actually failed.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
In the Kampuchean-Vietnamese conflict, Beijing’s ineffective signals led to an 
extended deterrence failure. China made two fatal mistakes in conveying threats. First, it 
wasted time on mixed verbal signals from June to August 1978. Not only did those 
signals encourage Vietnam to advance in Kampuchea, they also drove it to the Soviet 
Union. Second, it wasted efforts on ambiguous non-verbal signals. The deterrence failure 
was partially caused by China’s silence about its huge military aid to Kampuchea, which 
Vietnam could not accurately interpret. Additionally, seeing no sign of military threats, 
Vietnam underestimated the danger of Sino-Vietnamese war and took China’s clear-cut 
warnings in the last phase before the deterrence failure as bluffs. It accordingly attacked 
the Kampuchea with full confidence. In addition, neither BOI nor BOC is sufficient to 
explain the low credibility of deterrent threats if without considering defender’s signals.   
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY AND CHINA’S ASCENT 
 
Why do extended deterrent attempts fail? This study seeks to answer this question 
and contribute to studies of China’s Cold War coercive diplomacy. A successful extended 
deterrent threat, which is by its nature a problem of credibility, requires an effective 
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demonstration of the defenders’ interests and capabilities through a signaling strategy. 
Clear-cut signals, including words and deeds, lend credence and thus increase the 
possibility of successful deterrence. Ambiguous signaling, conversely, is likely to fail. If 
ambiguous non-verbal signaling, such as delaying or concealed military maneuvers, fails 
to check escalating disputes, the defender’s well-preparedness and political resolve may 
not be acknowledged, and thus extended deterrent attempts become less credible.  
 
 1950 1965 1978 
BOI To the defender To the defender To the challenger 
BOC To the defender To the defender To the defender 
Defender’s Signals Ambiguous Clear-cut Ambiguous 
Deterrent Outcome Failure Success Failure 
 
As the table shows, signaling strategy directly affected the results of deterrence 
outcomes in all three cases. Such effect could not be achieved by BOI or BOC, as 
predictions by either theory could not fully explain results. Moreover, a comparative case 
study, although imperfect, shows that signaling is a more powerful variable across time 
and space. First, for both the cases in 1950 and 1965, BOI and BOC favored the same 
defender and different protégés were challenged by two U.S. administrations. However, 
as the signals were interpreted differently according to U.S. archives, the results varied. 
Second, comparing the two cases of 1950 and 1978, different BOI conditions generated 
the same deterrent results, but signaling theory and BOC could explain the conflicting 
phenomenon. Third, BOC was invalid in explaining the different outcomes in 1965 and 
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1978, while signaling-assisted BOI could do the job. In conclusion, signaling technique is 
the only factor that survives all three comparisons.  
Besides its explanatory power, the research program of signaling extended 
deterrent threats is also crucial to understanding a rising China and its possible power 
projection over its de facto allies in mainland East Asia, such as North Korea, Laos, 
Cambodia, Myanmar and Central Asian states. How can we draw conclusions that will 
illuminate China’s foreign postures in the post-Cold era?  
First, what could we learn from China’s Cold War experience as a signaler to 
protect its allies? Chinese analysts emphasize that increased transparency can make 
China’s enemies more confident and thereby reduce China’s deterrent capabilities.228
Second, will China rise peacefully? Deterrence failure can explain China’s 
belligerent postures, especially use of force, to a certain extent.
 
However, as Cold War records show, a direct military confrontation with other powers is 
more likely if Beijing sent ambiguous signals. This might be more dangerous to China 
itself than demonstrating its limited interests and capabilities to achieve deterrent goals 
would be.  
229
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 China’s external use of 
force therefore is likely to be more frequent in future as its overseas interests grow more 
important. However, that China will do so is no more than a prediction. There might be a 
possibility of a peaceful rise, if China achieves extended deterrent goals. As discussed in 
this paper, mastering strategies for signaling—conveying interests and capabilities 
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64 
 
through careful maneuvers over its signals—would safeguard China’s protégés and 
improve China’s own security environment as a continental power. 
 
 
 
 
